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The current political and social turmoil in the erstwhile
Soviet Union challenges the U.S. to devise new methods for
effectively dealing with Russia and the independent republics
of the Commonwealth. Part of this challenge involves the
evaluation of the most likely changes arising from the
revolution, the most probable course of events, and their
implications for U.S. foreign relations.
This thesis argues that the history of Russian liberal
reforms has followed a definite pattern, and that an
examination of the history of these reforms can provide U.S.
foreign policymakers a tool with which to understand the
dynamics of today's situation. Ultimately, this thesis argues
that the U.S. must become thoroughly intertwined with
Yeltsin's Russia and support the establishment of a liberal
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The current political and social turmoil in what was once
the Soviet Union is challenging Western governments to devise
new methods for effectively dealing with Yeltsin's Russia and
the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) .
The intricate challenge before us is threefold: evaluating the
most effective method to deal with the changes arising from
the 1991 revolution; discerning the most likely course of
events; and understanding the long-term implications for
international relations, especially between Russia and the
United States. Unfortunately, in the U.S. the last two
requirements have been overshadowed by the immediacy of the
former. That is to say, in this election year, the
administration, economists, and even the public-at -large have
repeatedly given short-term, personal diplomacy precedence
over the goal of long-term global stability.
In December 1991, Robert Gates, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, admitted before Congress that little
progress was made in discerning the revolution's most likely
developments and their affect on the rest of the world. Gates
claimed that, "we just do not know where this revolution will
1
lead. nl
We come, then, to our dilemma: If we accept Mr. Gates'
statement, we must logically conclude that the U.S. v/ill
approach Russia cautiously during the next few months, if not
years. The U.S. will have to wait and observe what develops
in the CIS before it can act. Obviously, this is a precarious
position: A nuclear-capable, potential adversary will undergo
rapid social and political changes while the U.S. can only
react, often while the next change is underway, hoping its
tardy responses will have the desired effect.
Theoretically, the U.S. can avoid this reactive policy
only by developing a flexible, coherent strategy which is
proactive and increases our dealings with the former
republics- -especially Russia. Only then can we hope to
influence the cultures involved and advance democratic
principles. To do this, we should use all the tools available
to understand our potential allies and then plan for their
change. Only then can we meet our world leadership
obligations head-on and with the confidence that our policies
are appropriate for our goals.
But today's problem is more than just theoretical. How do
we unravel the tangled ball of string that is the CIS and
]Robert Gates, Congressional Testimony (Atlanta: Cable News
Network, Dec. 10, 1991), live report from Washington, D.C., 10 Dec.
92 .
discern the solution to such a complex and knotty problem as
its social and political restructuring? We must begin by
building a paradigm, or methodology, within which to work.
This paradigm should reflect the culture in which we will
labor, the reality of today's situation, and the social
perceptions of the people we hope to influence. Additionally,
it must encompass as many disciplines and operational levels
as possible to gain a thorough picture of the object of our
concern .
'
To do this would take far more space than available in a
Master's Thesis. Therefore we should lay out the foundation
of our work in a logical sequence in such a way that it will
be lucid and concise, yet universal in application and
understanding.' Consequently, we will frame our paradigm with
only three assumptions: (1) The study of Russia's history
will provide clues to the culture and its view of the recent
liberalizing reforms; (2) The disenfranchised people of Russia
are the source of social unrest, but the ruling elite are the
only ones who can actually change the character of the
^The concept of using a broadly-based paradigm to explain
man's actions within a society are drawn from the suggestion for a
"New Paradigm." See: Robert C. North, War, Peace, Survival: Global
Politics and Conceptual Synthesis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990),
'Sigfried Kracauer, History: Last Things Before Last
,
completed by Paul Kristkeller (New York: Oxford University Press,
1969) , 18.
country's government; and, (3) Russia, herself, will continue
to dominate the majority of U.S. foreign policy decisions in
the European theater. 4
Armed with our assumptions and a guide with which to build
a paradigm it is now possible to chart the waters we will
navigate in this examination of Russia's reactions to liberal
reforms and the their end result. First, this thesis will
define the two types of reform Russia has experienced and the
concept of Russian Core Values. Next, we will identify prior
Russian regimes whose ideology and legislation qualify as
liberalizing reform, examine the core values evident in the
Russian reaction to them, and make a brief analogy to today's
Russia. Ultimately, this thesis will seek to prove: The core
values of security, stability, and predictability have always
worked in opposition to liberal reforms, causing them to
eventually fail; that today's social and political
liberalization of Russia is also likely to fail if left to its
own (i.e., without massive external exchange and assistance
from liberal democracies); and, that an m-depth knowledge of
these core values and their effect on the Russian political
system is necessary to discern the appropriate U.S. response
to promote democracy in Russia.
^Any work of this scale is only as good as its evaluation of
the problem it frames. As a result, the author makes only the
fewest and most basic assumptions necessary to examine the problem,
and eliminate the possibility of "assuming the problem away."
B. Using History Within a Culture
History is not unitary, but pluralistic. Every region
and area has its own history, and the investigation of
causation becomes possible when it is seen that the




To attempt to solve any problem confronting man as a whole
is both a complex and arduous task. Regardless of the
discipline within which an individual endeavors, he eventually
confronts the disparity between his own norms, mores, and
values, and that of the culture he studies. As a result, he
must acknowledge his own limitations not only of
understanding, but also of interpretation, evaluation, and
application. This is particularly true when attempting to
discern the eventual pattern and resulting policy implications
of Russia's liberalizing reforms. Therefore, it is imperative
that we closely examine Russia's history, the cultural values
evident as a result of liberal reforms, and their influence to
divine the most likely outcome of today's social turmoil.
Any attempt to use history to discern a pattern or
theoretical argument, however, immediately confronts the
theories behind the study of history. To propose that history
is completely cyclical in nature is to ignore the uniqueness
of man. At the same time, to deny that man's actions set the
''Frederick J. Teggart, as cited in Robert F. Berkhofer's A
Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis (Toronto: Collier-
Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1969), 250.
foundation for the future ignores continuity, contingency, and
man's impact on society. Perhaps the most accurate way of
looking at history, then, is to use it in concert with other
aspects of human behavior, and the sciences which govern their
study. To justify this approach, we have only to acknowledge
the continual call for scientists and social theorists to
combine certain elements of their work in order to make some
sense of man's actions." This is especially true in history,
for
It is here that the historian has to go beyond his
events in an act of intellectual recreation unnecessary or
impossible in the natural or social sciences. . .although he
cannot reject evidence which is undeniably accessible, it
is open to him to interpolate from it in a manner which is
not given to the sciences, which rely on experimentation
to test their hypothesis. 7
This approach accepts the fact that man as an individual
is unique and varied; that he is ingenious and can go beyond
logic to solve problems.' It also allows a certain amount of
repetition, or habit, to creep into the evaluation. The
latter point is critical in any study of history, especially
within a culture, since:
"Berkhofer, 4-5
7Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory (University, AL
University of Alabama Press, 1969), 22.
'Berkhofer, 260-321.
The social universe with its near-stable customs and
volatile opinions, its small groups and masses, would seem
to fall under the rule of nature. In other words, it is
possible, and legitimate, to break down the phenomena that
make up the universe into its repeatable elements and




These statements summarize our foundation for studying
man, but what of the nature of man in a society? If we
acknowledge that man is indeed unique and capable of
independent thought, 1 " we must also consider that he is a
creature of almost rigid habit and norms. 11 But from whence
do those norms come? The culture and society in which an
individual is reared establishes a certain amount of
socialization which, in turn, affects a being throughout his
entire life. Consequently, a man often makes decisions based
not only on logic, as Kant, Weber, and Dilthey would have us
believe, but on his emotion. "As a result, humans sometimes
act without a clear relat ionship--without a cause and effect--
and are left attempting to justify their actions in concrete
and observable terms." 1-
We come to realize, then, that while history "represents





places," 1 ' it is also strongly influenced by the context in
which the individual operates. Additionally, it implies that
man's routine and reasoning is, by-and-large, predictable, 14
and that we inherit attitudes, habits, values, categories, and
skills from our society which often endure for centuries.'"
This, then, requires us to structure our study along the
lines of examining the culture and history of our subjects
rather simply evaluating them in laboratory isolation or as a
"mirror image" of our own society 1 '; a critical position
since we seek to evaluate a culture whose history and
political lineage are an enigma to most Americans. Obviously,
then, to study Russia during this time of severe civil unrest
requires knowledge of both Russian history and culture.
At this point, a standard criticism of historians appears:
The attempt to compare the past with the present will always
yield skewed results since there can be no direct parallels.
The claim is that the problems of studying man in the past are
substantial in scope, if not in number. Partial or absent





'"Dilthey differed form Kant in that the origin of mankind's
knowledge was not a priori, but a product of lived experience,
i.e., the culture and society influenced an individual's perception
and action. For further discussion, see: Leff, 29.
8
social change to a particular historical occurrence are
legitimate concerns, let alone drawing conclusions for today's
events, are the foundations of this criticism. 17 Admittedly,
an individual, even within the same society, is fundamentally
different from his ancestors, and the situations he faces are
just as diverse.
But, while the criticism appears valid, there is
substantial proof to the contrary. Some of the evidence
proving that an individual is similar in concerns and actions
to his ancestors was cited earlier. Additionally, we should
counter by acknowledging that, "even if no one else is around,
the definition of a situation and the action in it will be




While it is true that all historical 'laws' crumble upon
closer inspection, it is equally true that all of them
comprise a hard core of substantive observations and
experiences, some growing out of an intimate contact with
historical reality. 1 '
Finally, it is true that the study of man is not
scientific. The lack of results from scientific studies does





consistencies from generation to generat ion---only
difficult.-" Therefore, experience in this practice does
imply that, while exact parallels usually cannot be drawn,
there is a vast body of social theory which points to a
surprising amount of similarity between generations. That is
to say, to use history in addition to current social theory
often allows us to look beyond the distracting details, many
of which have nothing to do with the issue, and discern the
common interests and threads of a society, eventually defining
a path specific to the culture which is studied.- 1
Therefore, to speak of historical parallels within a
culture is a valid expression of a useful attempt to
understand the past, present, and future of a society as a
whole. After all, "histories such as that of the Earth and
the cosmos are narratives just like that of man. While their
laws are those of the natural scientist, the laws of human
history are nearly as binding. " J - The answer to the
criticism is simple: "When the historian studies change and
continuity, the repetitive and general must enter his study so
that he knows where to look and understands what he finds."" 3







From our conclusion, we understand the necessity of
studying an individual within his culture, and that his
actions are a product of immutable principles of behavior
defined by that culture. This leads us generally down the
same path as behavioralists of the 1950s. Unfortunately, they
chose to focus on the predictability of man as proven by
statistical data, which severely limits both the application
and appeal of their theories. As a result, their path
contradicted the independent nature of man discussed earlier,
and they were largely discredited since man's uniqueness often
disproved their predictions. But, while our way lies in the
same general direction, the path we will take is a much more
accommodating one, -4 which will account for the need for
diversity cited earlier.
This does not negate the attempts of those 1950s
behavioralists. Their logic has helped establish the path we
travel. But, "historical behavioralism refers not just to the
statistical techniques, but to new methods and theories
dealing with man's behavior . ""'
What guidelines, or laws, should we use then to define
this apparently anarchical view of man and his history? While




definition, they still rely, correctly so, on the elements of
mankind--which are studied in the human sciences of
psychology, sociology, and anthropology, to name a few.^ fc
Perhaps the best discussion of using behavioralism in a manner
consistent with our examination can be found in Robert
Berkhofer's A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis , in
which he states there are a few general rules we must
followj7 :
1. The orientation of analysis needs to take account of
the interpersonal as well as intrapersonal
.
2. The orientation must be a dynamic interpretation.
3. It must allow for free will and rationality as well as
emotional, irrational thought.
4. It must permit complexity.
5. It must be broad-based and tolerant, but still give
limits
.
6. It must reflect current thought and yet remind us of
"the social determinants of behavioral knowledge."
These are the guidelines under which this thesis will operate.
In conclusion, the end of our rather arduous, yet
essential, journey into historical theory yields a viable
foundation for our examination of the social and political




identified some propositions fundamental to any examination of
our subject. First, we acknowledge that man is unique, and is
therefore capable of acting without regard to external
influences. Second, we established that man is also affected
by his society and culture. As a result, he will think and
reason along lines that are generally predictable if one
considers his cultural and ancestral lineage. Third, we
established that it is legitimate to examine the effects of
today's social unrest in terms of similar situations from
yesterday. Lastly,
the situational interpretation of human behavior is
dynamic; it sees the interpreting of situations as an on-
going process, for the actor is constantly evaluating how
things were, how they are, and how they may be. Thus, the
evaluation of the elements in a situation involves the
cumulative as well as the immediate experience of an
individual in a society. Each individual, therefore, will
have an image of his society's history as part of that
cumulative experience."'-
Therefore, a behavioral approach along the lines of our
study can, at least in theory, yield a discernable pattern of




In any work dealing with abstract concepts and ideals, and
particularly in politics, it is necessary to thoroughly define
the critical concepts observed and evaluated as well as the
context in which they operate. Therefore, this thesis must
take this necessary step and define its most salient concepts
and the Russian context in which they operate. Without these
definitions the subsequent examination of Russian history and
politics would mean little since the diagnosis and prognosis
could possibly be misinterpreted. Since this is not the
intended result , nor would it allow this thesis to do what it
purports, this section will define those concepts and
assumptions key to the thesis argument.
The first sub-section of this chapter will define the
types of reforms experienced by Russia throughout her history.
They will rely on the most accepted interpretations of Russian
history and proven definitions that can be found in most
political science texts. Therefore, this section will simply
state the definitions of modernizing and liberalizing Russian
reform and avoid any analysis of the accuracy or value of the
definitions themselves. The last, and rather substantial,
14
sub-section will develop and identify, through an examination
of Russian society as chronicled by both historians and
foreign travellers alike, specific core values which play a
crucial part in the Russian culture and its acceptance of
liberal reforms such as we have recently seen.
A. Russian Reforms
To proceed with our thesis, we must also look at the types
of reforms that have been part of Russian history. After a
careful evaluation of various rulers and their plans, there
are only two major categories. They are:
1. Modernizing Reforms - Reform plans and legislation which
have as their goal the modernization of the country. This
modernization may take the shape of an influx of technology,
capital of modern design, updated labor management practices,
or even an update of academic theories and instruction. In
Russia, both Peter the Great and Catherine the Great attempted
to modernize the country while maintaining their autocratic
hold on power. This last point is significant since it
delineates the difference between a modernizing reform, and a
liberalizing reform.
2. Liberalizing Reforms - Progressive change in the political
and/or structural nature of a country in which the authority
15
divests and decentralizes its power, usually through a voting
process, to the constituency. The change comes about as a
result not of revolution (as in the French or American
Revolutions), but as a result of a gradual opening of the
political process, which occurs within legislative purviews.
While there are various degrees of liberals, who support
change in government toward the divestiture, they all focus on
the nature of an individual's rights as the key to legal
rule."
These two types of Russian reform are critical to our
examination. They will provide us with a common terminology
as we seek to understand the Russian ethos in times of liberal
reform.
B. Russian Core Values
This unnatural composite of the minutiae of Byzantium and
the ferocity of the horde, this struggle between the
etiquette of the Byzantine Empire and the uncivilized
virtues of Asia has produced the prodigious State that
Europe sees rising today and whose influence she will
perhaps feel tomorrow without the power to understand its
source ... [emphasis added].' 1
~'Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies: Their Origins and
Impacts, Third Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall, a Div.
of Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1988), 19.
j
"Astolphe L.L. Marquis de Custine, Custine's Eternal Russia:
A New Edition of Journey for Our Time , ed . and trans. Phyllis Penn
Kohler (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976),
30.
16
When we evaluate Russia in the light of our historical
theory and definitions (see Appendix: Methodology- -Using
History Within a Culture) we find that there are, indeed,
certain cultural themes which have repeatedly guided Russia
through the tempest of liberal reforms. These themes, then,
yield specific core values which can be identified, examined,
and credited with their influence on society. They are the
thread which has been woven into the Russian cultural tapestry
for hundreds of years. Consequently, a thorough understanding
of these values and their influence will assist us in
discerning the most likely course of today's events in Russia.
There is, however, one more piece of foundation to lay.
We must embark on an analysis of the society in which we will
operate and define it within its own cultural boundaries. It
is imperative at this time that we draw these boundaries
because there is a tremendous difference between the culture
of the West and that of Russia, and since to fail to do so
would make us guilty of the sin of mirror-imaging mentioned in
the introduction.
Ever since a lone twelfth century teutonic knight wandered
into a bizarre kingdom east of then-known Christendom, Russia
has been an enigma to the West. General descriptions of the
Muscovite State since the sixteenth century included and
repeated three main features:
17
1. The State government was always of a military
structure
.
2. There was a supreme, centralized, authoritarian
structure based on service, not rights and privileges.
3. The head of the government possessed all-encompassing
authority and supreme jurisdiction.' 1
Various reports also include a backward nation consisting
of oppressed and disenfranchised millions, in which the people
have reacted violently to change. Such were the intimate
details provided by a certain Prince K. to the Marquis de
Cust ine
:
I am going to give you a key that will serve to explain
everything in the country you are entering. Think at each
step you take in this land of Asiatic people that the
influence of Chivalry and Catholicism has been missed by
the Russians; not only have they not received it, they
have acted violently against it with animosity during the
long wars with Lithuania
.
JJ
These observations, however, were not just the impressions of
the occasional foreigner who stumbled into Russia; but they
were the impressions of hundreds of visitors, casual,
official, and diplomatic alike, who had experienced Russia--
lived within its borders. Two of the most noted observers of
the Russian nation were French: Custine (mentioned above) and
Gide.
"Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition , ed . Robert Conquest
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), 74.
'Custine, 25.
Custine travelled throughout Russia for five months in the
spring and summer of 1839. Under the protection of Tsar
Nicholas I, he carefully observed the people, the culture, and
the government. His writings, while tainted by a western
perspective, reveal his sincere impressions of the Russians
over 150 years ago. He wrote that they were pious, accustomed
to hard living, supremely adroit, and enamored of order,
discipline, and service. Custine even implied that the
architecture of the Russian capitol, St. Petersburg, smacks of
a desire for predictability and regularity (due largely, no
doubt, to Peter I's influence)
.
Society's entire structure seemed to revolve around
service to the tsar--a servitude oppressive in nature and
accepted by the people as the way it should be
.
:; And here,
it should be noted that the most condemning evidence of
despotism and servitude was given not by Custine, but by Tsar
Nicholas I, himself, who said, "Despotism still exists in
Russia, since it is the essence of my government; but it is in
keeping with the character of the nation. "^
To further support Custine' s characterization, the
esteemed Russian Studies Professor, Tibor Szamuely, found






Two of the factors that determined the Russians' attitude
towards their state can be fairly easily pin-pointed. One
was their acute consciousness of the fact that only a
powerful and rigidly centralized State, in full control of
the nation's every resource, could ensure national
survival. Another was the largely artificial, centuries-
old isolation from Europe, and the resulting ignorance and
fear of the outside world: a feeling very similar to that
which led early cartographers to decorate uncharted seas
with the legend 'Here be monsters .'
^
As mentioned earlier, Custine also writes about the vast
cultural distance separating Russia and its political system
from the West . But just as he acknowledged this distance, he
also admits that the Russian culture is not def icient . . . only
different. As evidence of this, we have only to read the
following passage:
If the military spirit which rules in Russia has produced
nothing resembling our religion of honor, that does not
mean that the nation has less strength because its
soldiers are less illustrious than ours. Honor is a human
divinity; but in practical life duty is worth as much as
honor and even more than honor; it is less magnificent,
but it is more sustained and stranger ... The real strength
of nations is obedience to the power which commands them,
just as that of armies is discipline."
So, we see that the Marquis de Custine did for Russia what
' Szamuely , 60 .
''Custine, 27.
20
De Tocqueville did for the fledgling America.' He travelled
to an intriguing country, studied the land, its people, and
its governing system, and provided the rest of the world with
his impressions. This proves to be a promising beginning for
those who wish to resolve the enigma that is Russia. It is
also promising for those who wish to understand the culture
and its reaction to liberal reforms. But Custine's
observations were not unique. One hundred years later, a more
eminent Frenchman observed the same culture and wrote of his
experiences
.
In 1936, even though a great social revolution had
apparently changed the face of Russia in 1917, another
Frenchman, Andre Gide, took the same journey as Custine. What
he found was so similar to Custine's work, that his book could
appear almost as its paraphrase."* So numerous were the
parallels that it hardly seems necessary to cover the same
ground again."
In sum, then, we find that, "the observations [of Custine
and Gide] could easily be matched from any of the scores of
" 7A fascinating comparison of De Tocqueville and Custine's
observations was made in Irena Gross' The Scar of Revolution
(Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1991).
Jd Szamuely, 4-5.
"'For Gide's impressions of the Soviet Union, see: Andre Gide,
Return from the USSR , trans. Dorothy Bussy (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964) .
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descriptions of Russia published in the West over the past
400-odd years." 40 Apparently, Russia, even after the
Bolshevik revolution (which claimed to change the entire
nature and structure of society) remained the same.
Admittedly, there were differences, but the people were still
oppressed. They were still terrorized. And the titular head
of government (Stalin) still qualified as an autocrat.
In both cases, it was obvious to the observers that the
Russians were fundamentally different from westerners. Both
Custine and Gide found a nation whose foundation was, in many
ways, opposite to everything embodied in the liberal
democracies of the West. It seems, then, that Custine was
accurate in writing, "between France and Russia there is a
Wall of China--the Slavic language and character. In spite of
the pretensions inspired in the Russians by Peter the Great,
Siberia begins at the Vistula.""'
But, if the comments on the stability of the Russian
society and culture over one hundred years are something short
of remarkable, the body of evidence claiming the same for the
individuals within this society is extraordinary. In fact,
there is even substantial evidence that little has changed as
late as the 1970s in certain parts of Russia. Take, for
4
'Szamuely , 6 .
;: Custine, 68.
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example, this statement written by Victor Herman:
Many, if not most villages remain much as they were a
century ago, and some are primitive almost beyond
belief .. .Many villages still lack electricity and almost
have no running water. 42
But now we are no longer dealing with the society as a
whole, but with the individual and his environment. This also
takes us headlong into one of the greatest ongoing debates in
Russian area studies: "the Russian Soul."
For ages, academicians have argued over the existence of
the Russian Soul. And, if they agreed that it did exist, they
argued over its effect on the Russian mentality. Ultimately,
not only the academic community, but anyone who studied
Russia, Western and Russian alike, came to accept the "fact"
that Russians were different from most people. They wrote
such statements such as:
Anyone familiar with peasants and their village life can
easily see that all the paradoxical, contradictory and
enigmatic characteristics of what has been called the
"Russian Soul "--so mysterious to the Western world--are to




Statements like these ultimately supported the position that
42Victor Herman and Fred E. Dohrs, Realities: Might and Paradox
in Soviet Russia
,
Illus. Mary Ellen Dohrs (Southland, MI:
Independent Publishers, Inc., 1982), 67.
4i Ibid., 67.
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the individual was merely a microcosm of the enigma that was
the state.'3 '' However, the existence of the Russian Soul is
no longer the issue. The key point which must be understood
is that the perception it exists has forever changed, and will
continue to influence, both Russians and foreigners alike in
their understanding of the people and their place in the
Russian nation. 4 ' While we will not evaluate the issue of
"the Russian Soul" any further, we will examine one more
prominent trait which appears consistently throughout the
society
.
It has been said that the Russian is a historical being.
He appreciates the fundamental forces of history which have
produced the culture he knows today. Even Custme's trip made
this apparent as he retold a discussion with the
aforementioned Prince K: "History has its fatalities;
everywhere the past extends its influence over the present
.
Woe to the Prince who does not wish to yield to it." 40 But
the apparent obsession with history does not limit itself to
conversation. In fact, Russian literature repeatedly uses the
historical theme, to include reflections on the past and
44This understanding was, undoubtedly, the cause of several
misinterpretations or, at least, misunderstandings between the





forecasts for the future, to convey its message. "It is
interesting that both in literature and life the Russian
really loves to preach and to foretell the future while at the
same time using the past to deny the present . This remains
true even today." 47 So, the historic nature of the
individual Russian, combined with traits ascribed to the
Russian Soul have molded these people and their culture into
a strangely different society, the enigma in which few western
ideals produce the desired effect, if any at all.
Now that we have examined the cultural and the individual
foundations of Russia, it is necessary to consider the last
major factor of socialization, the government. Much of what
could be said here has already surfaced in earlier
discussions. And, as mentioned before, the supreme governing
factor seems to be order and a strong, centralized government.
But the desire for security, stability, and predictability
originates from a far deeper source than an individual's
insecurities. Paul Miliukov had perhaps the best articulated
understanding of these values
.
Compelling national need, wrote the famous Russian
historian, resulted in the creation of an omnipotent State
on the most meagre [sic] material foundation; this very
47Dmitrii Sergeyevich Likhachev, from a speech entitled "The
National Nature of Russian History," given under the auspices of
the W. Averall Harriman Lecture Series (New York: Columbia
University, 13 Nov. 1990), 16.
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meagerness constrained it to exert all the energies of its
populat ion--and in order to have full control over these
energies it had become omnipotent . ; "
This omnipotence of the State provided the security and
stability which, as we have seen, the people treasure. In
Russia's autocratic tradition, their desires were fulfilled.
To those who would criticize the strength or longevity of the
drive for stability, security, and predictability, it is best
to recall an account from Russia's dark past, when Ivan IV
(The Terrible) ruled with a seemingly unquenchable thirst for
power, torture, and blood.
Even in the face of Ivan IV s hideous reign of terror,
when he feigned abdication the people, in spite of his
cruelty, united with one voice to plead for him to stay.
'Anarchy was feared.' 4 '
As a result of this drive for autocracy, and the core
values of stability and predictability, the Russian state
developed, long ago, a character which required "insulators"
from external threats. Consequently, establishing buffer
states became a major facet of Russia's foreign policy. This
solved a dilemma brought on by another of Russia's core
values- -security . Unfortunately, the end result of such a
48Paul Miliukov, Ocherki Po Istorii Russkoi Kolturv, Vol. II,
3rd edition





desire can only be defined as imperialist, and that trait,
combined with the role the Orthodox church played in
propagating the idea of the "Russian Destiny," has always been
a major threat to the people of Europe. Again, Custine
provides the most perfect summary:
We deceive ourselves on the role that Russia wants to play
in Europe: according to its constitutive principle, it
would represent order; but according to the character of
its men, it would propagate tyranny under the pretext of
correcting anarchy--as if despotism corrected any evil!~ ,r
As we conclude our examination of the Russian culture, we
see that there are, in fact, certain aspects which stubbornly
transcend time and social revolution. And that these
characteristics may, in fact, be part of another enigma: the
Russian Soul. But the debate over its existence diverts us
from our purpose. We need simply to focus on the fact that
there is one common thread
[among] all the descriptions of Russia, past and present:
the astonishing durability of certain key social and
political institutions, traditions, habits, and attitudes
;
their staying power, their essential stability amidst the
turbulent currents of violent change, chaotic upheaval,
and sudden innovation."
So, the core values of security, stability, and
predictability have always played a key role in the
r
'°Ibid., 28.
r,1 Szamuely , 6 .
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development of the Russian and, later, Soviet state. Indeed,
it does seem that, "it is hard to change the mentality of a




III. Russian Liberal Reforms: Action and Reaction
It is true that nothing is abolished in Russia without
danger; peoples who lack any guarantee lean only on their
customs. Stubborn attachment to customs, protected by
riot and poison, is one of the pillars of the social
order, and the periodic assassination of rulers proves to
the Russians that this order can command respect.
[emphasis added]
From the intricate necessities of developing our thesis,
definitions, and the context of our work, we turn now to the
meat of our argument, namely that: Liberal reforms in
Russia's history have always failed because of the elites'
drive for security, stability, and predictability. To test
our thesis, we must therefore examine the only two examples of
liberalizing reform apparent in Russian history--the reign of
Alexander II and certain aspects of Nikita Khrushchev's reform
programs. By examining both the reforms and the reaction to
them, it may be possible to discern the general patterns
associated with liberalizing reforms, and their consequences.
We will, therefore, proceed by examining these two rulers, the
preconditions for their reforms, the reform plans themselves,
and the reaction of the political elite (which invariably





Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaevich, the future Alexander II,
was born on April 17, 1818 in Moscow four days before Easter.
The happy occasion was augmented by a multitude of special
circumstances. The fact that Easter was approaching, that it
was a healthy birth in Moscow, and that there was nov; a male
heir to the throne all played a part in heightening the joy of
the masses. Fireworks filled the skies upon the announcement
of the birth of the heir.-'5
While still an adolescent, Grand Duke Alexander travelled
through Russia on a seven-month tour of thirty provinces. He
visited places in which no Russian ruler had ever set foot.
And he saw peasant life in person.
During the conduct of his education, Alexander showed the
Romanov propensity for the military, which concerned his
educator, Basil Zhukovskii, since. "[he] foresaw that
Alexander would rule in a world very different from the one
into which he had been born." The European Industrial
Revolution would require leaders who understood trade,
economics, technology, railroads, and political
considerations. Therefore, when Alexander ascended to the
throne, he had completed perhaps the most comprehensive
r
' 4W. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs: Autocrats of all the Russias
(New York: The Dial Press, 1981), 427-428.
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training program of any tsar; a program dedicated to dealing
with the complexities of modernizing Russia. This education,
combined with his extensive service of fifteen years at the
higher levels of government made for one of the smoothest
transitions of any new ruler."''
He began to govern Russia according to his father's
principles. There was a slightly softer tone to his
regime, but both father and son believed in the integrity
of autocratic power, both idealized military principles,
and both directed all their attention to serving Russian's
welfare as they understood it.-' 1.
But, there were some significant challenges to be
overcome, and quickly, before Russia lost her standing in the
realm of international politics. One of these challenges was
the aftermath of the Crimean War."' In essence, the
confrontation of 1854-55 was worldwide, and saw Russia
defeated in many aspects, by a coalition of France, Great
Britain, Sardinia-Piedmont, and the Ottoman Turks. : ' During




Although the Russian defeat in the Crimea was not a direct
threat to Russian sovereignty, it did forebode a drastic shift away
from Russian influence in Europe and the resulting security. For
further discussion see: Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), 163-164.
,: The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 3, Micropedia (Ready
Reference), 15th ed. (Chicago: Encyclopedia, Britannica, Inc.,
1987) 737.
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Russia's military effort collapsed as the war turned a
disastrous fiasco in its Crimean theatre ... Alexander
conceded defeat, and a peace conference assembled at Paris
to end the conf lict ... Russia had been defeated in her
first great confrontation with Europe in four decades. It
was, without doubt, the end of an era. 59
But this debacle left Alexander to deal with the dismal
consequences of his father's policies. 61 Finally, to
reestablish Russia in the realm of influential political
actors, Alexander had to make drastic changes. The tsar was
faced with the great recurring dilemma of Russian power:
Namely . .
.
if Alexander hoped to preserve the glory his predecessors
had won for Russia, he must seek greatness in the less
exalted arena of domestic affairs. Russia must modernize
if she were still to compete with Europe's Great
Powers . 61
1 . Reforms
Faced with an undesirable, and perhaps untenable
situation, Alexander II still maintained the control and
determination to initiate unpopular, but vital reforms.
"Forced by the logic of the situation, the new monarch decided
to undertake, and actually carried through, fundamental
"Lincoln, 435
60For fascinating reading on the Crimean War and the roles
played by the major actors, see: Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War?
:
A Cautionary Tale (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985) .
c: Ibid., 575.
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reforms unparalleled in scope in Russian history since Peter
the Great . "
"
Dealing first with the failure of the Crimean War,
Alexander examined the reasons behind the defeat. This single
step was to reveal a plethora of problems which required the
entire restructuring of Russian society. First, the Crimean
defeat seemed to have had more causes than just an ineffective
military. Major threats loomed ominously over the majority of
Russia's social and political institutions. Some historical
studies cite the tremendous decline in the number of serf
laborers, inefficient production, and a "general loosening of
the social fabric" as factors requiring liberal reforms.
Otherwise, the economic pillar of Russia would collapse. b "
Other Russians were prepared to argue that serfdom not
only prevented the modernization of the army but was also
the reason for their nation's backwardness .. .Yet even
these arguments did not at first convince Alexander that
he must institute far-reaching social and economic
reforms. As his father would have done, he assembled a
select committee to discuss the reasons for the Crimean
defeat. From that point, an extremely complex interplay
of events and political forces set in motion a process
that produced the Great Reforms. 64
The Great Reforms were numerous and affected all levels
"Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 3rd Ed. (New




of society. Eventually, they would have liberalized
Alexander's government to the point it would have closely
represented the constitutional monarchies of today... had they
been allowed to continue. Regardless, it is appropriate to
list those reforms that were the most influential and
liberalizing in their effect.
a. Zemstvo Councils - Alexander established
representative bodies, which were largely self-governing"
and functioned very much along the lines of district or county
board of directors and advisory groups. They had under their
control almost all functions of local government, to include
health care, education, agriculture, and local trade. 6 *
Admittedly, there were responsibilities to the crown which had
to be met, but these requirements were far less demanding than
at any time in Russian history. In effect, the Zemstvos
eliminated the previously indestructible idea of service to
the tsar alone.
The Zemstvo system held several advantages for the
members. Among these benefits were Russia's first socialized
medicine and local educational planning.' But it also held





dest iny . . . and would have to act and plan accordingly. This
point was to become painfully obvious as the reform program
progressed
.
b. Education - Additionally, Alexander repealed "some of
the Draconian restrictions of Nicholas I's final years, such
as those on travel abroad and on the number of students
attending universities." 6 ' Of particular note was the
increased government stipends available and the tolerance of
the large influx of Jewish students at state universities.
In addition to the stipends and increased minority quotas,
there was also a general liberalization of the educational
process, which included open debate criticizing government
policies, and a shift away from the quasi-military academy
establishments of his father. This was a radical change from
the reign of Nicholas I, who focused his educational programs




c. Economics and International Travel and Trade - For
the first time in Russia's history, the state published a
budget . Even more remarkable was the fact that this budget
was open to public scrutiny, and often added fuel to radical
68 Ibid., 409
'"''Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The
Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1966) , 137 .
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groups who denounced the extravagant policies of the crown.
Still, its publication was never rescinded until Alexander III
came to power. Additionally, Alexander II established a state
bank to lend money to entrepreneurs and monitor economic
development in the country through monetary controls/
Finally, he eliminated much of the bureaucratic process for
gaining authorization to travel or trade abroad. '
Ultimately, these policies were intended to encourage an
influx of foreign technical knowledge, modernizing Russia's
infant industries and overcoming much of its backwardness.
The reality, however, was that the political elites saw these
policies opening the society to foreign influences,
threatening Russia's economic sovereignty, and exposing the
country to the uncertainty of international trade. This was,
as we will see, a reality the Russian elite could not accept.
d. Abolition of serfdom - Faced with the inevitability
that serfdom had to be eliminated to make social progress, and
that if he took no action there would be continual uprisings,
Alexander reportedly said that, "It would be better to abolish
it [serfdom] from above than allow it to be abolished from
7l A key point here is that the State Bank would monitor the
economic process, not direct. Admittedly, the bank did continue
previous autocratic control in some areas of its purview. But it
was far more liberal on balance than the Interior Ministry or
Finance Ministry had ever been before.
71Riasanovsky, 414-419.
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below." There were many facets to examine with regards to
this reform. 7 -' Many of Alexander's concerns centered around
the structure of the military, and the apparent inability to:
(1) train the peasants, (2) maintain their training, and (3)
deploy them from the fields in any semblance of a military
organization that would be successful on the modern
[Nineteenth Century] battlefield.
On 19 February 1861, after lengthy meditation in the
seclusion of his study, Emperor Alexander II signed the
Emancipation Decree. . .It was the miracle that all Russians
had been eagerly awaiting, and like any other miracle it
was expected to transform everything around in a trice. 7
This reform, although only a part of the liberal reforms
Alexander instituted, is the most obvious of all since it
"directly affected the status of some fifty-two million
peasants [roughly an amount equal to today's population of
Ukraine] , over twenty million of them serfs of private land
owners." 74 Unfortunately, however, the emancipation of the
serfs in Russia failed to answer the same question the
emancipation of the slaves failed to answer in America .. .what
do these millions, recently emancipated, do to survive? Now
that the peasants were no longer tied to the land, their
A thorough, yet concise discussion of the issue of the




unrestricted movement provided at least the potential for
severe unrest and social turmoil. For,
once Alexander freed Russian society from the rigid
controls his father had imposed, the expectations of
public opinion moved ahead at a far more rapid pace than
did his reform program. As a result, even though the
Emancipation Acts of 1861 were far more generous than
anyone had dared to dream when Alexander ascended the
throne, they fell far short of Russia's [the serfs and the
intelligentsia' s] expect at ions
.
7I
And when it became apparent that the millennium was not to be
achieved overnight, disillusionment set in. 71 The reaction
to emancipation [which will be covered fully in the next
section], however, effectively did away with this tremendous
potential for social upheaval. 7
e. Press and the Intelligentsia - As mentioned above,
restrictions on the minorities in the universities, the
forming of student groups, and the criticism of government
policies were relaxed to an unprecedented extent. In concert
with these reforms, Alexander took a new look at the mass
media. Eventually, he banned almost all forms of
' Lincoln, 437 .
7
'Szamuely, 225.
77At this point, in particular, it is critical to understand
the dichotomy between the Russian political elite and the
disenfranchised masses. The emancipation whetted the appetites of
the masses for more liberalizing reform... but threatened the power
base of the political elite.
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censorship, 78 further opening the political and social
process of both criticism and debate.
f. Military reform - As mentioned, the defeat in the
Crimea demanded fundamental reforms of the entire military
system. Under the auspices of the Military Reform Act of
1874, Alexander totally restructured and redefined the service
to the tsar. He shifted his emphasis from a serf -oriented
force to supporting a citizen army, made largely of
reserves. 7 ' The Act, which combined with the positive
attributes of the Education Reform, had the added benefit of
raising the quality of the soldiers, since they were largely
literate as a result of his policies. 80
g. Judicial - Alexander established, for the first time
in Russian history, judicial review and public trial-by- jury
totally independent of the administration of the tsar. ij
This radical step went hand-in-hand with the establishment of
the Zemstvos, and furthered the Russians' ability to be self-
determining and policing. In essence, this was the legal
foundation of the liberalizing reforms Alexander established.






"deprived the Romanovs of absolute control over the
dispensation of justice in their Empire, thereby changing the
very nature of autocracy in Russia."- -
Alexander reformed the entire system, not just civil
law. This all-encompassing reform was required by the nature
of the new social order, which "had to protect the personal
and property rights of Russia's newly emerged citizenry ," '"
a citizenry whose lifestyle began to grow anarchical and
turbulent by its own standards. Still, "Russia began to take
long strides on the road to becoming a modern nation."" 4
But the reforms Alexander instituted, essential in the
restructuring of Russia, "had side effects neither he nor his
advisers had foreseen. " bI The most important issue left
unsolved by Alexander II was his goal, or the end to the
reforms. "The government failed to resolve the fundamental
dilemma of change: where to stop. [As a result, there arose
radically progressive groups who pushed for further revision.]
But neither Alexander II nor certainly his successors were
willing to go that far. Instead, they turned against the







Even the great Tsar-Liberator was not comfortable with
the pace of the liberal reforms he had enacted. Ultimately,
he began to favor a more centralized, structured approach to
modernizing Russia. "Decisive change away from reform came,
according to most historians, in 1866, following an attempt by
an emotionally unbalanced student, Dmitrii Karakazov, to
assassinate the emperor." 8. At this point, it became obvious
that the reforms would be overtaken by a much stronger force--
the Russian drive for security, stability, and predictability.
Nikitenko, the well-known liberal professor of
literature, remarked upon this [revolutionary] propensity,
and its probable outcome in his diary under 1862...
A
terrible fate is being prepared for our country by all
these ultra-progressives. And what is it they want?
Instead of gradual reforms, instead of rational
development, they want a violent transformation, a
revolution, which they are trying to induce artificially.
The blind fools! As if they didn't know what kind of
revolution is the only possible one in Russia! They want
to posture on the stage, they want to play at making
history--but inevitably they will be the first to be
ground down by history and swept away in its maelstrom."''
The Tsar, himself, had a strong counterreact ion to his





was broader, deeper, and more potentially dangerous. In fact
Too many hopes had been pinned to the reform, too much had
been expected of it too rapidly for its actual advent to
produce anything but a feeling of disenchantment and
letdown. With expectations keyed up to an ever-rising
emotional pitch ever since the young emperor had first
proclaimed his intention of emancipating the serfs, public
opinion was deeply disappointed by the hard terms imposed
upon the peasants ... The government, it was felt, had now
shot its bolt--and f ailed .. .Other ways and means would
have to be devised. 89
Alexander confronted yet another paradox of Russian
leadership: the nation, which so desperately needed
liberalizing reform to maintain it's standing in the
international community, was growing increasingly violent
toward the reforms which would be its savior. Consequently,
Alexander turned toward a more conservative approach to
governing Russia. Unfortunately, he found that,
Although the government could not return to the old ways,
it could stop advancing on the new road, and try to
restrict and limit the effectiveness of the changes. And
in fact, it attempted to do so in the second half of
Alexander II 's reign, Alexander III, and Nicholas II until
the Revolution of 1905. 90
That is to say, once you remove the lid is from Pandora's Box,






If we are to discern the patterns of the Russian
culture in the face of liberal reforms, we must look beyond
the reign of the Tsar-Liberator, and examine the reactions to
his legacy. Therefore, we must look to the reign of his son,
Alexander III, and beyond to understand how the Russians view
liberal reforms.
The reaction to Alexander II 's reforms intensified,
rather than abated, with his death. Because Alexander III
perceived the liberal reforms of his father as threatening the
power of the tsar, he "set out to restore to the Romanovs'
autocracy the power and glory it had known in the early
nineteenth century."' Consequently, with Alexander Ill's
ascension began a counterref orm plan almost equal in scope,
yet negative in influence, to that of the Great Reforms. It
was, after all, a logical time to stop the reform begun by his
father; and the counterref orms played to the strengths of
contemporary political opinion--the beliefs of the Russian
gentry. JJ Additionally,
Alexander III saw the recent reforms as threatening the
power of the autocracy. As a result, he not only rejected
further reform, but actually moved to limit the effects of
those changes already implemented. Both he and Nicholas




" counterreforms , " which actually caused more trouble. The
themes were: 1.) Reliance on a gentry which was declining
in power, 2.) Orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality'"' , 3.)
Police and direct, compulsive measures. 94
The magnitude of these counterref orms should not be
discounted, especially since they affected as many, if not
more, aspects of daily Russian life as the original
liberalizing programs. It was a far-reaching plan, and...
over a period of years, reaction [to Alexander II 's
reforms] also expressed itself in the curbing of the
press, in restrictions on the collection of taxes by the
zemstvo and on the uses to which these could be put, in
the exemption of political and press cases from the
regular judicial review. 9S
But these, and other programs, will be covered in more detail
later
.
While it is true that Alexander III inherited a Russia
in which the potential for economic growth and development far
surpassed that of any other time in Russian history, it is
also true that he was willing to pursue this goal only through
policies far more centralized and, "with a far more rigidly
''Riasanovsky points out that part of the foundation of the
counterref orms was a reliance on these historical and traditional
aspects of Russian civilization--Russian nationalism. Alexander
III saw the church and state as inseparable in the old order, and
used this pillar as a major theme upon which to rebuild the empire.
MRiasanovsky , 43 3
"-Ibid., 421-422.
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controlled political framework" 91 than that established by
his father. As a result, Alexander saw his first task as the
reestablishment of the tsar's supreme control.
To assist him in the reconsolidation of power,
Alexander enlisted the support and theories of noted
academicians, themselves Russian conservatives or gentry
members. Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Count Serge Witte, and,
under Nicholas II, Peter Stolypin all opposed Alexander II 's
reforms with regards to the zemstvos, legal system, army
structure, and the emancipation of the serfs." The main
point to their opposition was that the liberal reforms
threatened the consistency [stability and predictability] of
Russia by unleashing tremendous social forces with the
potential for her destruction.
From this foundation, then, began Alexander Ill's drive
to control the perceived damage his father had wrought on the
Russian autocracy. After an examination of his programs, it
will be clear that they were, "designed to impose political
stability- -not further liberal reforms and pluralism in
government."'^ They were intended to curb the sweeping





centralized, bureaucratic, and class nature of the Russian
system. ""
The Manifesto of May 11, 1881 proved Alexander Ill's
determination to suppress revolution and maintain autocracy.
And, as a result of his repressive counterref orms and strong
tendencies toward russif ication, "Alexander III has often been
considered the first nationalist on the Russian throne.
"
10C
a. Temporary Regulations - Alexander III issued
"'Temporary Regulations' to protect state security and public
order." 101 Their intended purpose was to give appointed
bureaucrats the greatest possible liberty in dealing with
radical, pro-reform groups (e.g., The Will of the People).
And, because they were so vaguely written, they were
eventually applied to anyone whom officials suspected or
simply disliked. Originally tendered for only three years,
the Temporary Regulations were repeatedly renewed, providing
Alexander III with a legislative form of martial law.
b. Russif ication - In keeping with Alexander Ill's
tendency toward russif ication, several regulations were
established which oppressed religious minorities. Some of
these regulations: (1) Designated any child who was the




product of a mixed marriage (Orthodox and any other religion)
as Russian Orthodox, (2) Prohibited all churches but the
Russian Orthodox church from proselytizing, and (3)
Established mandatory restrictions on travel, education, and
trade of Jews. 102 Additionally, Alexander III "authorized
campaigns to persecute non-Orthodox religions and to convert
populations to Orthodoxy." 1 "'
c. Establishment of "Land Captains" - Another of
Alexander Ill's counterref orms totally restructured the
Zemstvos established by his father. Of particular note was
the reinstatement of the gentry as a voting class with
disproportionate representation, and the establishment of a
petty bureaucrat with unlimited veto power called the "Land
Captain." 1 " 4 The Land Captain, in fact, was directly
responsible to the tsar's administration through the interior
ministry, but also held total control in the zemstvo in which
he served. 10 " This counterref orm actually destroyed the
politically self-governing Zemstvos.





"'There are some basic similarities here between the Land
Captains and what would become, after the 1917 Revolution,
Communist Party officials in the towns and villages as well as
Zampolit
,
or Political Officers in the military.
47
Alexander Ill's russif ication program. Alexander was
particularly concerned about the Jews, which "occupied a
prominent place in [his] thoughts and policies throughout his
reign, for he was easily one of the most ardent anti-Semites
to sit upon the Russian throne." 1 '" Jews were excluded, in
large part, from higher education, operating small businesses,
and openly worshiping. There were even mass relocation
campaigns which were intended to eliminate the Jews from many
of the larger cities. The anti-semite legislation went so far
as to make it a crime for a Jew to bear a Christian name.
Alexander's confidential decrees against the Jews resulted in
treatment similar to the early years of Nazi Germany. These
decrees were, in fact, often well-camouflaged, and simply put




e. Forty-Nine year Indemnity Tax (Redemption Payments) -
While Alexander III could not rescind the Emancipation Act
of 1861, he did accomplish the next best thing. He
established an Indemnity Tax on the former serfs, which would
be applied for forty-nine years after their emancipation."' "
This was quite a significant change, since the peasant not




only had the burden of surviving as a freed man, but also bore
the overwhelming yoke of making redemption payments to the
tsar; a tax that took almost the entire life expectancy of the
peasant (which was approximately 52 years at the time)
.
Alexander III had, in fact, negated his father's progress in
social reform.
f. Repeal of the University Program - The University
Statute of 1884, which replaced that of 1863, "virtually
abolished university autonomy; students could not form groups
or organizations, and curtailed higher education for women and
minorities." 10 " This drastically altered the educational
program established under Alexander II . It increased the
focus on the military aspects of schooling while severely
curtailing academic discussion and criticism of the
government. The result: the expulsion of large numbers of
minorities and women, and the complete, and now irreversible,
destruction of the free thought and much-needed constructive
criticism.
g. Oppression of the Intelligentsia and the Elimination
of the Free press and Debate - Following from the
counterref orms operating in the academic arena, and the
stifling of creative and critical thought, came a specific




critical debate in the mass media. No longer could they
publish journals, let alone articles, which criticized the
government. This counterreform rapidly became far more than
just an irritant for the intelligentsia, it had, in fact,
destroyed the medium of their debate. Alexander III
reestablished the custom of censorship in the Russian press,
and even eliminated most of the liberal journals and
periodical publications. 110 "Russia's periodical press had




In conclusion, then, we find that Alexander Ill's
counterref orms were born out of fear, the fear of losing:
international prestige through open trade and interaction with
the outside world [security]; centralized power and social
complacency through continued democratic reform [stability];
and simply the nature of living in Russia, where the
orderliness of day-to-day activities provided individuals with
continuity throughout their lives [predictability]
.
Konstantin Pobedonostsev, a high-ranking official under
Alexander III best represented the essence of Alexander Ill's
counterreform movement. "The state, he believed, had as its




among men. In Russia, that aim could be accomplished only by
the means of autocracy and the Orthodox Church." 11 ^
The elites' conservative reaction to the Great Reforms
did not, however, stop with Alexander III. In fact, they not
only continued unimpeded, but gathered momentum under Nicholas
II, who ascended to the throne in 1894 upon Alexander Ill's
death. 11 - Such was, and is, the strength of Russian elite
reaction to liberalizing reform. Truly, in this circumstance,
the Russian elite had "acted violently against" 114
democratic, western-style reforms whose end result would have
brought them on a more even footing with the great nations of
the West
.
But this is not the only example of elite reaction to
liberal reforms. Almost exactly one hundred years later a





114Taken from Prince K's speech to Marquis de Custine cited
earlier. See: Custine, 25.
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B. Nikita Khrushchev
"Sometimes [Khrushchev] has bursts of democracy." 1 '
-- Mitya Chernenko
After Stalin's death, the triumvirate that ruled the
Soviet Union had to deal with tremendous, destructive problems
and a lack of strong leadership to control the bureaucracy.
The problems were complex, numerous, and life-threatening for
the Soviet Union. Among the most serious to be confronted
were: (1) A poor planning system for industry and agriculture,
(2) A lack of coordination between all elements of production
and distribution, (3) Stalin's forced industrialization, which
had caused a general flight from agricultural lands to the
privileged industrial cities, and (4) The denial of capital
and incentives to the farms, which had resulted in low food
production and a poor work ethic. 1U
When Nikita Khrushchev addressed the 20th Party Congress
and made "The Basic Indictment" against the personality cult
of Stalin, it was clear to all a new era had begun. 11 Often
forgotten, but certainly important, is Khrushchev's claim that
the Soviet Union would now be ruled according to Lenin's Last
•'Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs , Trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 249.
m
'Harry Schwartz, ed . Russia Enters the 1960s (Philadelphia:
J.B. Lippincott Co., 1962), 180.
n7Ibid., 17-27.
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Testament. 118 No longer could the Stalinists hide what the
founder of the nation had intended ... the Last Testament would
be the last word in furthering socialism and attaining
communism. But Khrushchev was still vulnerable, and was not
able to totally consolidate his power until two years later.
"Finally, in March 1958, Bulganin, who had been disloyal to
Khrushchev the preceding year, resigned as head of the
government. Khrushchev himself replaced Bulganin, thus
combining the supreme effective authority of the Party and of
the state.
"
m Khrushchev now had carte blanche to carry out




At this point, we must remember that the ideology of various
leaders is not the subject of our study. The fundamental issue
examined is the liberal nature of reforms in the historical and
cultural context. That Khrushchev had ideological, or perhaps,
even personal, motives is immaterial when one considers the reality
of his reforms' impact on the Russians.
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1 . Reforms
a. Opening of debate -
In September [1953] Khrushchev made an important
statement on agriculture that indicated an increase in his
power... and at the same time admitted more bluntly than
had ever been done before the horrifying state of the
collective farms. 1-' 1
From 1953 until 1962, Khrushchev allowed freedom of
speech, press, and of the arts to a degree unknown for almost
forty years. Of particular note was the work of Aram
Khachaturian, Dmitry Shostakovich, Eugene Evtushenko ("Babii
Yar"), Alexander Solzhenitsyn ( One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich ) , G.F. Alexandrov ( The History of West European
Philosophy ) , Ilia Ehrenburg ( The Thaw ) and others who were
moderately liberal by western standards, but radical when
compared with the standards of Stalin's era. Admittedly,
there was some repression. But, "for the most part...
Khrushchev's regime confined itself to verbal warnings and
refusals to publish or exhibit, and the limits of the
permissible, though fluctuating, were certainly broader than
before Stalin's death."-—
At the 22d Party Congress, Khrushchev again made bold
strides toward opening public discussion to all aspects of
-•Donald V. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Boston
Houghton-Mif f lm Co., 1981), 440.
-Treadgold, 442-458.
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Soviet life. A key aspect of this liberalization was forcing
the party to accept an ongoing, legitimate debate of all its
elements from theory to bureaucratic practice. Consistent
with this theme, Khrushchev remarked,
Is this emergence of various opinions inside the Party
at various stages of its activity, especially at turning
points, possible? It is possible. How is one to deal
with those who express an opinion differing from that of
others? We are in favor of applying the Leninist methods
of persuasion and exploitation in such cases and not
repressive measures. 1 -'
Admittedly, statements like this are proof not of liberal
reform but of anti-Stalinist policy. However, it must also be
acknowledged that, while the new policy had the theoretical
base in discrediting the previous regime, it also had a
practical application which allowed criticism and debate
unknown since the early 1920s to flourish in the Soviet
Union... a definite step toward the liberal democratic
principle of free speech.
b. Legal and Electoral Reform - Hand-in-hand with
Khrushchev's own form of glasnost ' , or 'openness, ' came an
attempt to establish the importance of the law and of the
ballot. Proof of this can be seen in the divestiture plan,
which revived the system of local judicial review. "In 1959,
a device long intermittently used was energetically revived:
' J:Nikita S. Khrushchev as cited in Schwartz, 123
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the comrade's courts, in which one's neighbors and fellow
workers might mete out certain punishments for social
delinquency." 124 These courts were, in fact, wholly
independent from the central bureaucracy in petty civil and
misdemeanor crimes. And, while we must admit that this reform
produced mock courts whose power was abused, we must also
acknowledge that it had, at its foundation, an egalitarian
principle ... independent judicial review.
If the reestablishment of a form of judicial review and
the opening of the Party apparatus to discussion are not
sufficient to qualify as liberal reforms, certainly
Khrushchev's claim that the leadership must respond to the
constituency indicates a generally liberal atmosphere. His
exact words were:
A leader promoted to his position by the Party and the
people should not abuse his power... the collective of
leaders should realize that it is impermissible to allow
a situation where anyone, even the most deserving person,
could cease to recognize the views of those who promoted
him to his position. '--
From 1956 to his removal in 1964, Khrushchev relied
heavily on the Party's voting apparatus to amass support for
his reform programs. Perhaps the most dramatic of several




attempted coup in 1957.
Khrushchev espoused reforms which would fundamentally
restructure much of Soviet society. This, in turn, caused
friction between him and the more conservative Communist Party
elite. In fact, "one of the main sources of these frictions
was Khrushchev's determination to effect significant reforms
in the institutions and operating procedures of Soviet
Political life." 1Jt ' Consequently, the other members of the
triumvirate wanted to remove him from office before their
power was threatened. 1 "' When they confronted Khrushchev, he
challenged the legal basis for their decision to oust him by
saying he was voted in by the entire presidium. . .he must be
voted out by the same organization. In effect, Khrushchev
called for an immediate "vote of confidence" from the
electoral body to which he was responsible.
Thanks to some shrewd political maneuvering, and the use
of military airplanes to transport delegates back to Moscow,
he eventually sponsored a referendum on whether or not he
should resign. The delegates, stunned that such a dilemma
should come "out of the blue," refused to entertain that idea.
After their vote, it was clear that Khrushchev won the battle
Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West: From
Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990) , 44 .
- Treadgold, 455 .
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to remain in power. The end result: a government
referendum carried more power than the desires of those
controlling the government.
Although unsuccessful in eliminating Khrushchev, the
opposition learned a valuable lesson: to remove this crass
little man from office now requires a majority vote from the
elected body... not just the will of those at the top. The
1964 opposition would not repeat the mistake of those who had
gone before.
At this point, a critic could suggest that Khrushchev's
reforms of law and voting procedures were liberalizing only if
they applied to all sectors of society. To reply to that
criticism we have only to look at the evidence, which suggests
that the rules worked against Khrushchev as well as for him.
For example, when General Petro Grigorenko criticized
Khrushchev's policies and growing personality cult at a Party
meeting, he used the Party bylaws to continue his presentation
in the face of conservative opposition. 1 -"' The short-term
result was that Grigorenko was allowed, after a vote of the
delegates, to finish his entire speech (an unprecedented
occurrence for a speaker so critical of the leadership) . And,
although the long-term result was harsh (he was
--Grigorenko, 224.
-'Ibid., 240.
'excommunicated' from the Party), he was not executed as had
often been the practice in the Soviet Union.
Therefore, we see that the double-edged sword of legal
action and legitimate voting, a sword which Khrushchev himself
removed from its scabbard unburnished, could be wielded by
both the king and the pawn in the political game, and the
rules applied to ruler and plebeian alike. Consequently, we
can debate Khrushchev's decrees, and perhaps even tag them as
useless monologue founded in anti-Stalinist politics. But,
the practical applications of his legal and electoral reforms,
as shown above, proved his policy was more than just empty
rhetoric. It was, indeed, a fundamental shift toward a more
liberal government.
c. Rehabilitation - Much as a priest cleanses the souls
of sinners during mass, Khrushchev cleansed the soul of the
party in the late 1950s and early 1960s through his policy of
rehabilitation. This policy forgave the transgressions, most
of which were Stalinist fabrications, of individuals
liquidated during Stalin's purges. 1 ' 1 Prior to the
rehabilitations, the families of those damned by the Party
received privileges and rations limited by their relative's
' The subject of the Great Purges, or Bolshiye Chistki, is a
fascinating one in and of itself. For an excellent discussion of
the reasons behind, actions during, and consequences of the Great
Purges, Let History Judge by Roy A. Medvedev (New York: Vintage
Books, 1971) is highly recommended.
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transgressions. Afterward, all was forgiven and life could
proceed without the stigma that had been previously attached.
At first examination, this policy may not appear to be a
politically liberal one. 1'" 1 However, it is widely accepted
that the context and intent with which it was delivered (to
correct the problems and condemnations of the personality
cult) was one of the first steps toward eliminating a
bureaucratic prejudice of the regime. 13 '1 This, in turn,
paved the way for equal treatment of citizens and their
families, and went a long way toward providing the benefits of
the Soviet system to all members of society.
Khrushchev ended the use of executions as a means of
eliminating political crimes, preferring, instead, to hold
Party trials to determine the appropriate punishment
.
liJ
Proof of this was his elimination of Kaganovich, and Bulganin
who were simply removed from office and retired with a modest
but adequate pension. 1J4
d. Agriculture and Economics - In the areas of
agriculture and economics, Khrushchev instituted a system of




1: Treadgold, 4 52.
• "Schwartz, 12 9.
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subsidies of consumer goods and promoted what could have been
the beginning of a market-based system (albeit, with communist
idiosyncracies ) . When he first came to power, Khrushchev
treated private plots as incentive. That is to say, he saw
the profit made from selling private plot produce as a benefit
and an incentive for the peasant. ljr As a result, until
about 1957, there were no penalties for those with
entrepreneurial spirit. 13(
In addition to these modest steps, he also restructured
the entire planning system, which included planning input from
the local production facilities and Party leaders and local
control of production capital. 13 ' He placed the control of
the capital into the hands of 105 new Economic Councils
(Sovnarkhozi) li '° and abolished the State Economic
Commission. 1 This was, indeed, a radical suggestion
compared to the Stalinist model. It was also a system which
liSTreadgold, 440.
:; Riasanovsky, 607.
1;/Of particular note in this restructuring program is the
elimination of the state-run tractor pools, which held all major
farm machinery, and allocated it according to the Five-Year Plan.
Under the new system, collective and state farms kept and used the
equipment as they needed it. This proved to be a double-edged
sword as they also had to maintain it... of ten without sufficient
technical training or tools.
' "Treadgold, 455.
• 'Ibid. , 451.
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divested the control of capital, labor, and one's own life to
the individuals concerned. The result of Khrushchev's
restructuring was "to enhance the power of local [emphasis
added] Party secretaries at the expense of the Moscow
ministerial bureaucracy." 140
He stretched the planning cycle from five to seven years,
and added perhaps the most liberal revision of any leader--a
periodic review of the production goals and output by the
local governments, not the central planning authority.
While, admittedly, most of the reforms listed above were
undertaken as part of a De-Stalmizat ion plan, they were also
part of a package which sought to increase participation,
representation, initiative, competition, and the freedom of
internal and external trade by divesting power and the
planning process to the local levels. Compared to Stalin,
this was, indeed, a liberal concept. In political structure,
agriculture, economics, and other areas it does appear that,
during the Khrushchev era there were serious efforts made
toward bending, though not breaking, centralized control
by moving some major operational decisionmaking
responsibility to the production level. Few significant








When we look back at Khrushchev's regime, we come to
realize that, actually, 1958 was probably his zenith.
"Disillusionments followed in rapid succession. Economic
development went sour; Khrushchev's exhortations and his
economic, administrative, and party reorganizations .. .were
increasingly ineffective in resolving the crisis." 1 '
There was also increased criticism of his routine
handling of the bureaucratic system. 144 To put it bluntly,
some saw his personality cult as growing to rival that of
Stalin. When they said so, as was the case with Soviet
General Petro Grigorenko, they were removed from public
office, disgraced, and often placed in sanatoriums . . . but they
were not shot . l4 "
From what we know of the Russian political culture, we
can see that an elite conservative reaction, which would
reestablish control and provide security, stability, and
predictability, would be in order. In an eerie parallel to
Alexander II, the conservative reaction began even before
Khrushchev was forced out of office. "What stood out with





[Soviet] ruling coalition's stance on such issues as the
division of Germany and the need for a substantial
reinforcement of Soviet military strength ." 14t
But international politics was not the only area in
which the conservative elites considered Khrushchev
threatening. "Nikita's libertarian experiment, in particular
his constant attempt to shuffle those at higher levels, made
him persona non grata in the highest levels of
bureaucracy." 147 Suddenly, not only were the security,
stability, and predictability of Russia threatened, but those
of the apparatchiki (political elite) were endangered as well.
Sensing the offing in the wind, Khrushchev turned
increasingly autocratic, 148 lending credence to the "Good
Khrushchev--Bad Khrushchev" reputation he has since
acquired. 149 But this change came too late. In April of
1964 he was removed from power by a conservative Soviet coup.
This situation provided the impetus for a conservative elite
reaction to Khrushchev's liberal reforms. Leonid Brezhnev was
the embodiment of that reaction.




:4cThis action bears a striking similarity to that of Alexander





revisionist like Khrushchev would be an apparatchik with a
taste for the status quo and the desire for the stability and
predictability of "business as usual." To that end, Leonid
Brezhnev was chosen as Khrushchev's successor. And, in a
fitting tribute to Khrushchev's fundamental changes of the
system, the ex-Premier did not 'die in office, ' nor was he
executed. He was merely removed, disgraced, and given a dacha




When Brezhnev ascended to power his "first order of
business was to undo some of the 'hare-brained schemes' [he]
accused Khrushchev of perpetrating ... [Eventually
,
] as the
post-Khrushchev leadership sought its bearings, its domestic
orientations assumed a distinctly conservative cast." 1 " 1 As
part of Brezhnev's consolidation of power, he too embarked on
a program which he claimed would develop socialism in the
USSR, moving ever-closer to the elusive communist goal. But,
while this program appeared to promise much of the
liberalization included in Khrushchev's plan, the reality was
something quite different.
150For a superb account of Khrushchev's fall from power, and
the Brezhnev era see: Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia
in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present
,
trans. Phyllis B. Carlos (New York: Summit Books, A Div. of Simon
& Schuster, Inc., 1986), 597-701.
lsl Sodaro, 73.
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Brezhnev's programme had been a radical-sounding one:
the modernisation of the Soviet Union into what was called
'developed socialism', accompanied by the 'scientific
management of society' . . . .Brezhnev relied on the party to
co-ordinate development and thus eschewed a shift to the
market and decentralisation .... and avoided greater
autonomy for Soviets and other mass participatory
bodies . 152 [ sic]
We find then, that after twelve years at the helm, the
net result of Khrushchev's liberal reforms was almost nil.
While progress had been made on many fronts, "nearly all of
his changes. .
.
[had] been invalidated through a gradual
reinst itution of strong central planning control." 1 "' After
a decade of liberal reform, during which the Soviet Union had
made its two steps forward, the backwards step took the form
of the Brezhnev regime. 1 "' 4 The story of Yulii Daniel and
Andrei Senyavskii, writers who criticized the Soviet regime
during the early years of Brezhnev's watch, gives us some
insight into this transition to conservative rule:
The trial of Yulii Daniel and Andrei Sinyavskii in early
1966 signaled a new toughness in the Kremlin's dealings
with dissidents in the cultural community. DeStalinizat ion
became a relic of the Khrushchev period. 1 -"
^-Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms (1985-1990) (New





IV. Transition to Today
A. Gorbachev's Inheritance
After reviewing the liberal reforms of Alexander II and
Nikita Khrushchev, we see striking similarities in both the
impetus behind and the elite reaction to liberalization. Both
reforms questioned the fundamental structure of society. Both
reforms attempted to open the bureaucratic mechanism to the
masspolitik to correct societal deficiencies. Both reforms
caused the conservative elite to coalesce into a reactionary
group which undermined liberalization efforts.
Understanding this political heritage is key to our
thesis, especially if we are to evaluate modern liberal
reforms and their most likely outcome. Using our methodology
and the results of previous attempts, we can now turn to our
goal--evaluating the liberal reforms of Mikhail Sergeyevich
Gorbachev from 1985 to 1990 and the resulting implications.
Unfortunately, in attempting this we run headlong into a
problem confronting scholars studying any part of what was the
Soviet Union--primary source material. This problem arises
from two points: First, much of the material covering debates
about key issues remains classified (even under Glasnost ' ) and
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is, therefore, unavailable. Second, much of what is available
was severely influenced by party propaganda, subject to
bureaucratic approval, or simply (as witnessed during the
accident at Chernobyl) lies. ist Indeed, it may well take
years of painstaking research and interpretation to produce an
accurate account of any of the aspects of Soviet policy. 1 "'
Therefore, much of our examination of Gorbachev's reforms
will rely on his personal statement of Perestroika' s
formulation and goals, as well as several substantial foreign
(to the Soviet Union) works on the apparent programs and their
effects. Ultimately, however, we will see that like his
liberalizing ancestors, Gorbachev paid the price for
threatening Russian security, stability, and predictability.
B. Perestroika
To examine Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet
society is to undertake a complex endeavor. First, westerners
should be aware that the term perestroika is a word with many
interpretations. The Soviets' own Russian-English Dictionary
'"'•Fundamentally, this is a statement of the obvious to most
Soviet analysts. But the degree of 'misrepresentation' of the
sources can vary, and therefore be useless in providing any
consistent evaluation. A monograph which covers these points as
part of its major theme is David Marples' Ukraine Under
Perestroika: Ecology, Economics, and the Workers' Revolt (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1991).
1S7Robert Conquest, presentation on Soviet Archival Studies at
the Stanford-Berkeley Conference on Russian Studies (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University, 10 April 1992).
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But in Gorbachev's usage, this special term had but one
application, one meaning--a complete rebuilding or redirecting
accomplished by razing existing structures and starting anew
to build communism. . . "a 'revolution in the hearts and minds of
the people.'" 1 "' Bearing this in mind, we can now proceed to
examine the reforms of Mikhail Sergeyevich.
Gorbachev's political background is well-documented.
His first major accomplishment was an innovative agricultural
program which yielded 30-50 percent more crops in an area near
Stavropol. While his program was controversial (Khrushchev-
style innovation during the Brezhnev era) , he was allowed to
continue to experiment. Eventually, he gained the attention
and confidence of those at the pinnacle of the Party--namely
Yuri Andropov. In March of 1985, he came to power "as the
candidate of those who wanted change, or at least realised it
lzyiRusko-Anqliskee Slovar' (Russian-English Dictionary)
,
ed . by
A. E. Smernitz (Moscow: Russian Language Publishers, 1977),
Prmted-Russian to English, 418.
''Dev Murarka, Gorbachev: The Limits of Power (London:
Hutchinson, 1988), 54-56; as cited in Geoffrey A. Hoskmg, The
Awakening of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990) , 130.
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could no longer be postponed." 160
But, when Gorbachev came to power, it was by no means
a political cakewalk. The old guard of the Party realized
that many problems were reaching 'critical mass', but they
were reluctant to abandon the security they had known during
the Brezhnev era (and was implicit under Chernenko and
Andropov) . Eventually, realizing the country was in deep
economic and political trouble, the Party settled on Mikhail
Sergeyevich Gorbachev to lead them to the promised land. The
legacy which Gorbachev inherited was one of
declining economic growth rate, stagnant if not falling
standards of living, and growing corruption, but also the
basic principles on which the Soviet system was based
appeared in need of a radical overhaul. 161
The first year, in particular, had its trying moments
for the man the Party elected to save them from destruction.
For,
Only a year after becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev
had to cope with the nuclear reactor explosion at
Chernobyl, followed by massive earthquakes in Armenia and
Central Asia. At the same time, there was a series of
droughts combined with excessive heat and premature cold,
all of which had a serious impact on the Soviet harvest.
On top of everything else, the world price of oil dropped.
Since petroleum had accounted for over 60 percent of the
Soviet Union's hard currency earnings, this reduced the
country's ability to pay for its imports. Nor did it help
u ' JHosking, 127
u,1 Sakwa, 20.
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when the Soviet Union was forced to import more grain to
compensate for the poor harvests. 1 "
With the legacy mentioned above, Gorbachev recognized
that economic reform was essential to maintain the viability
of the Soviet Union. But this economic reform, whatever shape
it would take, held some inherent risks. As an economic
reformer, Gorbachev would have to combat the determined and
fearful bureaucrats to implement any changes which
decentralized Soviet economic structure. Ultimately,
he [was] faced with two alternatives. Either the reforms
fail, in which case perestroika [was] doomed, and the
Soviet Union [would] probably fall apart and certainly
cease to be a great power. Or they will succeed,
engendering working-class unrest and ethnic tension to a




After seventy years of communist rule, the economic
reality, at the level of the citizenry, was best summarized in
Sacks and Jerry Pankhurst's Understanding Soviet Society :
However badly the Soviet economy works, Soviet citizens--
among them the majority working class--have learned to
'work' it. This working class is not as easily
manipulated for reasons of greater education
attainment ... Its potential to react in ways that are
''Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist, " Foreign Affairs




undermining and disruptive, if not militant, to an
economic package it finds unpleasant and, by its
standards, unfair, is significant. 1 "5
To deal with the economic crisis confronting the Soviet
Union, Gorbachev claimed strength from the greatest of all
revolutionaries, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 16 ' In Perestroika
,
Gorbachev wrote, "We have to look back at the sources of our
Great Revolution to realize what kind of society emerged from
it and why we need another revolution of no less
importance . " 166
Gorbachev, himself, delivered the most concise
statement of his economic reforms during the 1987 plenary
meeting in Moscow. Under the presumption of working from the
central authority to the edge (reform from above, as he called
it)
,
he espoused fundamental changes in the economic structure
of the Soviet Union. Chief among these reforms were 167 :
1 . A change to enterprise with complete cost
accounting
.
2. A change [unspecified] in the economic planning
system.
3. A change in the price formula and subsidy system.
^"Understanding Soviet Society
,
ed . Michael Sacks and Jerry
Pankhurst (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1988), 49.
lbSMikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our




4. A restructuring of foreign economic ties.
To summarize, it is significant that Gorbachev spent so
much of his book on the economic situation. Clearly, he saw
this as the greatest threat to the Soviet Union, and all
others paled in comparison with it. Consequently, he
implemented reforms which are radically liberal in the context
of the Soviet system. The establishment of cooperatives,
election of managers, self -financed factories, encouragement
of individual enterprise in small-scale production and trade,
and closing non-paying factories are all radical economic
ideas which Gorbachev instituted. Clearly, Gorbachev designed
these reforms to move the Soviet Union toward a more
efficient, market-based system. Also, we cannot fail to see
the decentralization and independence required by such
measures. But, there is no stronger evidence that his
economic reform was liberalizing than his own call to, "wake
up" those who have "fallen asleep" and make them truly active
and concerned to ensure that "everyone feels as if he is the
master of the country, of his enterprise, office, or
institute. This is the main thing. " ut [emphasis added]
In addition to his economic reforms, and in an uncanny




recognize the diversity of opinion. . .to accept differing views
as beneficial to the state. To accomplish this, he called for
the Party to work closely with the intelligentsia (film-
makers, writers, artists, composers, architects, theatrical
figures, and journalists) to thoroughly investigate and
discuss issues confronting the failing country. 17c
Finally, we can turn, yet again, to Gorbachev to
discern the true purpose of his reforms. After examining the
evidence, we see that late in 1987 he published his monograph,
Perestroika
,
in which he perfectly summarizes both the method
and the goal of his liberal reforms:
The main idea of the January Plenary meeting -- as
regards to ways of accomplishing the tasks of
Perestroika and protecting society from a repetition





Unfortunately, much as Alexander II and Khrushchev,
Gorbachev fell prey to his own programs. What started out as
an "urgent necessity" 17 -' to maintain the place of the Soviet
Party turned into a desperate grasp for power. As he neared





secret Party meetings abounded. Yet, Gorbachev was initially
unwilling, if not unable, to quell the unrest of the
conservatives. In the end even Gorbachev felt threatened and
pulled back from his reformist stance. Indeed, his "ability
to maintain a sort of split personality as both Party man and
[reformer] was what enabled him to shatter the Stalinist
system.
"
17J Although he was a political chameleon, the
reaction to liberalization began, once again, with the
reformer himself.
Criticism also came from the ranks of the elites, who
had condemned, yet tolerated, much of Gorbachev's reforms.
Yet, we must, in all honesty, state that,
Gorbachev's failures are not surprising. Consider what he
proposed to do; take a huge, multinational empire that had
been created by force and coercion; give it a large
measure of democracy, while loosening all the traditional
bonds that held it together. 174
The ultimate conservative elite reaction, the coup
(putsch) of August 12, 1992, signalled the practical end of
Gorbachev's ruling coalition. While he continued in power for
another four months, he was, in fact, a lame-duck ruler.
During this time he could only acquiesce to the popular
demands as voiced by Boris Yeltsin.
17jRobert G. Kaiser, "Gorbachev, Triumph and Failure," Foreign
Affairs (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No. 2), 160.
174 Ibid., 163.
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Unlike Alexander II, the opposing liberals successfully
replaced the ruling elite. But they, too, had to overcome the
Russo-Soviet bureaucratic inertia and cultural baggage. As we
look at today's mounting opposition to Yeltsin's reform
package, we realize that the liberal program initiated under
Perestroika may well have completed the second step of
political progress in the pattern of Russian liberal reforms.
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V. Conclusion
With the bulk of the thesis completed it is now clear that
there are, indeed, cultural values at work within the circles
of the political elite which oppose even Yeltsin's liberal
reforms. The 'free' media, itself a creation of Gorbachev's
Perestroika, reports that the understanding of a free market
system and the acceptance of further liberal reform are
rapidly decreasing as stability, predictability, and security
are increasingly threatened. 17 - In addition to the elite
reaction, a greater number of Russians than at any time since
the August coup associate themselves with either a pro-
Communist or highly conservative political movement. 17 ''
Evidence suggests that the people are indeed growing weary of
reform and its accompanying hardships.
We should not find this surprising, especially if there
has been no social upheaval and restructuring since the last
attempts at liberal reform. Indeed, our historical
7
'Arnold Horelick, presentation under the auspices of The
Annual Donald M. Kendall Lecture (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University, 18 May 1992).
"Adrian Karatnicky, presentation to Modern Ukraine class
(Monterey, CA : Naval Postgraduate School, 18 April 1992).
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examination of the culture under liberal reform indicates that
some progress will be made, but that much will be undone in a
conservative backlash to the liberal reforms; thus
perpetuating the pattern of two steps forward and one back.
But before we accept this prognosis, we must consider
competing views and their merit.
A. Competing Views
As a result of our investigation, we find that there
remains some doubt as to whether Russia can channel today's
potential for civil strife into a conduit for creative and
pro-democratic actions. However, just as there is a large
body of pessimism on this subject, there is also a great deal
of optimism. Ultimately, "the issue becomes existential. . .can
they do it?" :77
Many in the west (like Mr. Gates) take the cautious
approach and claim it is too early to tell. At the other end
of the spectrum, many cite the achievements of Russian
entrepreneurs as proof that it may, in fact, be possible to
create a market economy and liberal democracy in Russia. It
is necessary, then, for us to examine parts of this spectrum
of opinion to strengthen our study, and to acknowledge
detracting theories. If for no other reason, we must do so to
"Nancy Kollman, presentation at Stanford-Berkley Conference,
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 10 April 1992).
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rebut the criticism that this thesis is overly deterministic
and fails to recognize some fundamental differences in mass
media, communications, education, and other key differences
between the country of the two previous liberal reforms and
the Russia of today. Indeed, many cite the Russian
entrepreneurial spirit mentioned earlier and ask, "Why can't
they develop like Western states? After all, the Russian
people seem a lot like Americans."
The three major arguments in favor of Russia becoming a
liberal democracy address both the internal and external
aspects of societal development. And, while these arguments
are the strongest to be made, they are also fundamentally
flawed. Each one ignores some important social aspects that
can be responsible for democracy's undoing.
There are two internal counter-arguments which focus on
the progress already evident in the Russian political system.
The first of these emphasizes the role of the media and the
education of the masses. This argument proposes that the
Russians are better-educated than at any other time in their
history. Their literacy rate, technical knowledge, and access
to a free press are sufficient enough to affect a liberal
change of the entire society -- including the conservative
79
political elites. 176 The claim, then, is that the educated
Russian masses, can force the bureaucracy to effect liberal
changes in the governing system.
While this is possible, the idea that the masses have
ever been able to change the political system of Russia is not
supported in her history. And, given the premise of our study
(cultural-historical bias) , if we cannot establish a tradition
or mechanism for such changes, we cannot fully support this
argument. Even if we the masses were to act independent of
their heritage, we would also have to acknowledge the
impending elite reaction (e.g., Yeltsin's authoritarian mood
swings) and its effect on the masses. This gives rise to the
possibility that Russia may go the way of Germany in the
mterwar years, where one of the most advanced countries of
the twentieth century manipulated its press, social studies,
and popular opinion to diabolical ends. 175 Clearly, media
influence and education alone are not sufficient for
irreversibly democratizing Russia.
The second argument emphasizes the role of the Russian
17eArchie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," Politics
,
Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia , ed . Seweryn
Bialer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 21.
179A superior work covering the academic, scientific, and
social perversion of Germany through the media in the interwar
years is Michael Burleigh's Germany Turns Eastward: A Study of
Ostforschunq in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988) .
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intelligentsia and its influence on the formation of political
structure and theory both in the power center and among the
populace. This argument states that the Russians have been
making progress all along, and that the intelligentsia have
been the moving force behind the advances. The intelligentsia
will, therefore, be the foundation for political




Interestingly enough, one of the chief proponents of this
theme, Dr. Nancy Kollman of Stanford, delivered a presentation
which all but dismissed this as a solution to the problem of
establishing a liberal democracy. When speaking of the
intelligentsia, she stated that, "They still seem to hold onto
the baggage of Russian nationalism... They still think in
terms of a grand scheme [for Russia] . " 18] Continuing on, Dr.
Kollman stated that some Russian scholars have, indeed, opened
their debates on history and politics, but not all have made
the changeover. Scholars are still reluctant to throw out the
Marxist-historical concept and, as a result, rely on this
while searching for a new paradigm. Therefore, they are
confronted with the overpowering task of forming a coherent
1S0Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley, CA
:
University of California Press, 1991), 124.
81Nancy Kollman, presentation at Stanford-Berkley Conference
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 10 April 1992) .
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theory of government not only with little foundation of
liberal democratic theory, but while trying to overcome their
inherent Marxist bias.
In its original form, this argument also asserts that the
Russian masses, as a result of the interaction with the
intelligentsia, are now participating in the political debate,
and are helping to form the foundation of a liberal democratic
movement. 182 This tenet, however, relies on citations from
letters to government officials and democratic activists,
which favor liberalizing change. Unfortunately, the reality
is that, "we do not want to treat the letters of the Russian
peasants to the power center as a true reflection of what
[they], as a class, feel... they are often biased by radicals
or influenced by the personage to whom they write." 183
Consequently, we return to the society's socialization process
as having the overriding influence on the Russian people.
It seems, then, that the influence of the Russian
intelligentsia may be overstated, or at least misunderstood.
Certainly, in fomenting public opinion and acting as a
catalyst for many uprisings, the intelligentsia has repeatedly
clashed with the autocratic government. Traditionally, this
"-James H. Billington, address to the House of the Academy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 8 January 1992)
.
lfejlRobert Conquest, Stanford-Berkley Conference on Russian
Studies (Palo Alto, CA: Date April 1992).
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animosity has not strengthened the intelligentsia's appeal for
the masses. In fact, by segregating itself from service to
the tsar in the early 1800s, the intelligentsia severed its
only ties with a source of mass socialization -- the
government . 184
So, one could conclude that the intelligentsia has,
indeed, played a role in liberalizing Russia over the years.
But one must also acknowledge that role has been small, and
that the progress made has followed the pattern of two steps
forward and one back. The answer to the problem of rapidly
liberalizing Russia lies not in the intelligentsia's hands
alone
.
The third major argument supporting the formation of a
liberal democracy in Russia focuses on external factors.
Drawing from historic parallels, this theory proposes that
societies do, indeed, change as a result of external inputs.
The overwhelming evidence can be found in both the Japanese
and German reconstruction earlier this century. Additionally,
proponents cite the continuing liberal advances of such
societies, whose authoritarian past would seem to doom any-
possible liberalization, as proof that the Russian society
,:";Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The
Eighteenth Century Nobility (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1966), 167-171.
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could also rapidly become democratic. 185
This argument is far more supportable than the first two,
and must therefore be examined carefully to discern its
significance. It strikes right to the heart of this thesis by
implying that history is not generally prescriptive, and that
societies can, and do, change in opposition to their heritage.
But the aspects which discredit this theory can be found in
two particular characteristics, which are very closely related
-- the length of time required and the degree of external
interaction needed to effect such change. Because these
characteristics are so closely related, we will deal with them
together
.
Truthfully, we must concede that both Germany and Japan
made the liberal transformation in a remarkably short time.
But the social revolutions of these successful nations must
take into account the second aspect -- the amount of external
influence required for the transition. Indeed, there seems to
be a direct correlation to the degree of external influence
and time required to become a liberal government.. For
example, both Japan and Germany made rapid transformations.
Is it a coincidence that both were occupied immediately
following World War II, and that the allies restructured their
I£ Donald Abenheim, discussions on Russian liberalization
Monterey, CA : Naval Postgraduate School, 7 May 1992).
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entire political system? 186 Furthermore, can the political
stability which occurred during the early years of liberal
reform be segregated from the presence of foreign troops on
their soil? Looking specifically at Germany, we must
acknowledge that there are, indeed, correlations to be made
between allied presence, a discredited right-wing movement,
and the creation of a liberal democratic government.
It appears, then, that without external interaction
similar in size and scope to the examples cited (Germany and
Japan) , the chances of Russia becoming a liberal democracy in
the next ten or even twenty years are extremely limited. We
can now answer a previous question ("Why can't they be like
us?") with the following:
Any comparative judgements about Russian and American
political behavior even today must consider the four or
five centuries of profound divergence between the two
tradit ions--one despotic, centralized, bureaucratic,
hierarchical; the other constitutional, decentralized,
individualist, egalitarian (at least with respect to legal
and political rights) . It is hard to conceive of two more
disparate lines of historical development. 187
Finally, we can examine the counter-arguments in the
Russian context we established and see that there is precious
lfctThis was especially true in the case of Japan. MacArthur
would not turn over the newly established, western-style government
to home rule until he was assured the ultra-conservatives could not
return to power.
187Robert V. Daniels, Russia: Roots of Confrontation
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 38.
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little evidence that supports their conclusions in the absence
of a cultural revolution; a revolution that cannot take place
without a tremendous influx of western-style liberal
democratic culture. Indeed, if the U.S. is to assist Russia
in making the transition, it must become intertwined at all
levels of economics, politics, and even defense to provide
support for further democratization.
B. Implications for the Future
The continuing disarray and lack of ideological
direction in the Soviet Union will likely result in
various negative developments, such as the resurgence of
the army, new waves of refugees to other countries, and an
increase in the number of technological accidents. The
West should be prepared for a long period of turmoil in
the Soviet Union. --Dmitrii Shlapentokh
We arrive at our conclusion, then, with a much more
enlightened view of the process of liberal reform in Russia.
It is clear, for example, that the continuity of Russian
history plays a major role in the development of society.
Each of the reformers, Alexander II, Khrushchev, and
Gorbachev, implemented reform plans designed to bring Russia
(or the Soviet Union) into the modern world. Each reform
threatened the political elite and their core values of
security, stability, and predictability. And, ultimately,
each program bore the seeds of its own destruction by failing





Armed with this knowledge, we can better appreciate the
dilemma in which Boris Yeltsin finds himself. He and his
entourage are, in many ways, workers building a temple of
democracy in a land with little clay for bricks. Their only
recourse is to build the foundation and the walls as best they
can, eschewing those who would raze it, and in the meantime
hope that the Russian people and Western governments will come
to their aid.
At times his position and policies may seem authoritarian
to the West, but we cannot forget the context in which he is
operating. We cannot forget that he has his own growing
opposition. His reality is, "today people still support the
reforms and the president, but if we go beyond a critical
point we'll set off a general disaster." 18 '' And here it is
important to acknowledge the elements of Russian nationalism,
often associated with Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, as
well as proponents for a either a fascist or Stalinist system,
who call for a return to a strong, highly centralized
government. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs , Andrei
Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, discusses
16 feHosking, 157-162
'"'Russia seeks deferral on debt interest," Associated Press-
Moscow, as reported in The Monterey Herald (Monterey, CA : 31 May
1992) .
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the dangerous prospect of fascist ideology staging a
comeback in some form. There also exists an audience only
too eager to welcome would-be fuehrers with their promise
of miraculously cheap vodka for all their grand vision of
restoring Russia in its grandeur to the borders of the
former USSR. . . .Many of us recall the warning from American
scholar, Richard Pipes, at the time of perestroika in the
former USSR, that behind the facade of complete renovation
old attitudes persist, as do the forces trying to bank on
them. This warning has lost little of its urgency. 1&c
In yet another historic parallel, their criticisms sound
remarkably similar to those of the past. 191 Their truth is
that
,
Freedom is a wonderful and seductive thing, but we do
not want freedom if, as has happened in Europe, it will
only increase our age-old debt to the people ... .We have
become convinced that so-called full economic freedom in
reality means nothing but unrestrained license for the
large economic forces and veritable slavery for the small
forces. . . .Political freedoms are incapable of changing the




Yeltsin's only resort is to turn to the democratic West
and ask for assistance in further democratizing Russia --
taking her beyond the point of irreversibility. Pleading for
economic and political support from Western democracies, he
Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," Foreign
Affairs (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1992), 5.
•'See earlier citation of A.V. Nikitenko, Moya Povest ' Samom
Sebve (My Story of Myself), Volume II , St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 78.
As cited in Szamuely, 155.
192Szamuely, 173-174.
88
said, "without such support 'a dictatorship will emerge.'
Everything his government had achieved would be threatened by
opponents on the extreme right. ... 'I have faith in the
reforms, which are irreversible. But should they fail, I can
already feel the breath on our neck of those who wear the
black and brown shirts.'" 193
Yeltsin may indeed leave office in 1996. r And, even
if he names a successor favorable to democracy, our historical
examination indicates that at some point a strongly
conservative regime will probably return. Our ultimate
challenge is to understand this process while continuing to
interact with Russia. If we cannot establish a western-style
democracy, we can at least prepare ourselves for the
authoritarian possibility and realize that our political
spectrum is far different than that of Russia.
Therefore, when we see a conservative backlash occurring,
we cannot afford to pull back from our commitment to
democracy. The key to understanding the changes underway in
Russia is to examine them within that nation's culture and to
participate, at every step, as both a partner and confidant in
the democratic process. Even if we fail to establish a
liberal democracy in Russia within the next few years, we must




not consider our task a lost cause. The greatest mistake
would be to brand it as an enemy without justification. To
think that the establishment of an authoritarian regime in
Russia signals the return of our nemesis would be narrow and
poorly informed.
The United States has been extremely successful in its
relations with authoritarian regimes, Singapore and South
Korea being the most noted examples. 1 ' Like those regimes,
the Russians, too, recognize the value of a certain degree of
centralized leadership during great social turmoil. We must,
therefore, accept the fact that the ability to change the
system is limited by her historical and political context.
Proceeding from that premise, the Russian truth today
seems to be,
There is nothing surprising in the fact that a man like
Chernyshevsky--with all his unshakable views on overriding
importance of equality and social justice, the need to
employ all means to achieve these aims, and irrelevancy of
constitutional and libertarian principles--should have
arrived fairly early at the necessity of a benevolent
dictatorship . ' "
*" : It is instructive to note that in both of these examples,
the United States has interacted successfully with authoritarian
governments. In South Korea, political and military means were the
chief forms of interaction. In Singapore, economic and a
considerable U.S. presence were the mechanisms used. Consequently,
in both cases the U.S. was able to wield considerable influence.
•"Szamuely, 17 7.
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Additionally, Mikhailovsky , denounced in the Soviet Union of
old, wrote words apropos for many Russians today:
Liberalism might be attractive to someone who is lucky
enough to be free from material want. Freedom is a very
pleasant thing. But liberalism interprets freedom in a
very narrow, purely formal way. It sees freedom in
abstract right, in paper permissions, in the absence of
legal bans. But liberalism does not understand that legal
liberty can be important only when the individual
possesses the material means to make use of this
liberty .. .All the constitutional minutiae have precious
little meaning for the man who has been deprived of the
physical means and the intellectual development needed to
savour these political desserts. 197
Finally, the real implication of this thesis is not that
the pattern of two steps forward and one step back will recur,
only that it is highly likely to reassert itself. Unless
there is a massive influx of political, economic, and cultural
goods, beyond the current emergency aid programs, Russia may,
indeed, return to authoritarianism. To preclude that
possibility, prudence demands that we immediately welcome
Russia into the fold in all aspects of international relations
and strongly support Yeltsin with both economic and political
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